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‘Because in Cyprus the only thing that is Cypriot is the donkey’  




The principle of bi-communality has been advanced as a founding feature of 
state-building in Cyprus. The aim of this paper is to provide for a systematic 
account of the different variations of the bi-communal principle enshrined 
in the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and in the Annan Plan as the 
most comprehensive proposal for the reunification of the island. In order to 
achieve its scope, the paper focuses on the provisions concerning State 
institutions and citizenship. It argues that in all those constitutional 
structures State-building is not linked with nation-building. In fact, the 
acceptance of bi-communalism as a fundamental principle of the united 
Cyprus proves that the main concern has been the accommodation of the 





In contrast with numerous state-building projects of the two past centuries, which had 
been centered on the idea of “one nation, one state”, in the case of Cyprus the 
recognition of the existence of two constituent ethno-religious segments on the island 
has been advanced as a founding principle of state-building. Such recognition was 
mainly expressed by the principle of bi-communality. Bi-communality was met with 
resistance by political elites of the two major communities, mainly due to their 
conflicting aspirations, i.e. ‘Ενωσις (Enosis – unification with Greece) for the Greek 
Cypriots and Taksim (partition) for the Turkish Cypriots. However, this principle not 
only prevailed as a fundamental characteristic of the London-Zurich agreements, but 
also survived in even more entrenched forms in all subsequent settlement plans and 
most saliently in the last UN-sponsored plan for a solution (the Annan Plan).1 
The purpose of the present article is to provide for a systematic account of the 
different variations of the principle of bi-communality enshrined in the Constitution 
of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and the Annan Plan as the most holistic attempt to 
reunify the divided island. We focus on those two settlement plans not only because 
they are the most comprehensive so far but also because they both represent attempts 
to manage the Cyprus problem in accordance with the interests of external parties.  In 
doing so, both fell foul of international norms that would contribute to their 
failure.  In the case of the 1960 arrangement, it was clear that the Constitution and the 
Treaty of Guarantee by allowing for multiple ways for external parties to interfere in 
the affairs of Cyprus was contrary to the very notion of Cyprus as a sovereign 
independent state. In addition, as we shall see in the following part of the paper, the 
political institutions that were set up provided scant opportunities for the development 
of a Cypriot national identity to underpin such an entity.  On the other hand, in the 
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case of the Annan Plan, the conflict has been with the conventions that have been put 
in place in support of the rights of individuals from a liberal perspective. In fact, we 
argue that the Annan Plan somehow froze a particular inter-group configuration in 
time by following a rather corporate consociational logic.2 
Our thesis is that in both those constitutional structures the Cypriot State-
building project is not linked with a nation-building one. In fact, the acceptance of bi-
communality as a fundamental principle of the united Cyprus proves beyond doubt 
that the main concern of the constitutional architecture is the accommodation of the 
political tensions resulting from a divided society.  
In order to achieve its scope, the article focuses on the relevant provisions 
concerning State institutions and citizenship. We consider that these two fields serve 
as stable indicators to our hypothesis that the overwhelming focus on securing the 
ethnic representation and crosschecks inevitably resulted in side-lining the discussion 
on a nation-building project for the island. Furthermore, the choice of these two areas 
is also dictated by the constitutional structure of the Republic and the envisaged 
united Cyprus. In the texts of both the Cypriot Constitution and the Annan Plan, a 
substantial number of provisions directly or indirectly refer to the political 
organization and institutional position of the two communities. 
 
B.  The Constitution of RoC 
1. Preliminary Remarks 
The content of the 1960 arrangement was formed by the surrounding historical and 
political factors at the time of its adoption. In this respect, the provisions therein were 
primarily intended to safeguard the interests of the three States involved in its 
drafting, i.e. the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. In particular, those three States 
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guaranteed Cyprus’ ‘independence, territorial integrity and security’3 and the integrity 
of the UK Sovereign Base Areas.4 More importantly, the Guarantor States undertook 
to consult each other with respect to the ‘measures necessary to ensure observance of 
those provisions’. However, ‘in so far as common or concerted action may not prove 
possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with 
the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the’ Treaty.5 It was 
precisely this provision that was used as a legal basis for the 1974 Turkish military 
intervention and as such questioned from the very beginning the very notion 
of Cyprus as a sovereign independent state. 
At the same time, the 1960 Constitution was failing to grasp the political 
aspirations of the citizens of the newly created State. In this regard, bi-communality 
was the meeting point of diverging political projects rather than a foundational myth 
to which Cypriots could aspire. Essentially, bi-communality ensured that the majority 
Greek Cypriot population would not exercise a determining degree of power over 
public affairs and, consequently, on the Turkish-Cypriot community. Further, Enosis 
and Taksim were expressly forbidden by the constitutional arrangement and the two 
communities were required to pursue a political project that had never been on their 
agendas before: independence and mutual cooperation. Time proved that this was not 
a viable option, mainly due to the antagonism between the elites of the two 
communities and the pervasive force of the dialectic of nationalism.6 
 
2.  A bird’s eye-view of the Constitution 
From the outset, Cyprus is proclaimed as “an independent and sovereign Republic 
with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being 
Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities of Cyprus respectively”.7 
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However, the founding stone of the Constitution is the existence of two communities 
and citizens belonging to either of them. In this respect, Article 2 of the Constitution 
defines the constituency of these communities in the terms of Greek or Turkish ethnic 
origin, language and cultural traditions and Greek-Orthodox or Moslem religion. 
It is only through participation in either of the two communities that Cypriot 
citizens can exercise the full range of their rights and duties. The division along ethnic 
lines runs through the entire text of the Constitution, bringing within the realm of bi-
communality the operation of all three branches of power; taking up office to public 
organs by way of fixed quotas reserved for each community; and an exhaustive list of 
competences that may be exercised or blocked by public officials, most importantly 
the veto rights of the President and Vice-President of the Republic. These rights could 
effectively paralyze the operation of the State. 
The Council of Ministers comprises ten ministers, which are allocated on a 7:3 
ratio between the two communities. In fact, this ration applies also to the number of 
the members of the Parliament, the members of the public service and the Public 
Service Commission and the security forces of the Republic. This balance is altered in 
the case of the army (6:4 ratio) and that of the independent bodies and officials. Last, 
the members of the judiciary were fixed to one representative from each community, 
plus a foreign judge in the case of the Supreme Constitutional Court and two Greeks, 
one Turk and one foreign judge in the case of the Supreme Court.  
Another salient feature of the Constitution is the exhaustive list of 
competences that both the President and the Vice-President are endowed with. The 
Constitution comprises a detailed enumeration of their respective powers, as well as 
the instances in which they may exercise veto powers. In essence, the ultimate 
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decision or blocking power rested with the two representatives of the Executive. This 
situation should be understood as the ultimate hurdle to the decision-making process. 
Another characteristic of the Constitution was the designation of some of its 
provisions as “basic” articles, which “cannot, in any way, be amended, whether by 
way of variation, addition or repeal”.8 Hence, the drafters of the Constitution created a 
cumbersome constitutional setting under the belief that, by securing the unchangeable 
nature of a significant part of the Constitution, the politically inexperienced 
communities would find their ways through this legal maze.  
 
3.  State Institutions 
In all three branches of power, the two communities worked exclusively along the 
basis of their ethnic affiliation. The Executive was under the heavy influence of 
President Makarios and Vice-President Küçük, the two figures that had led the 
struggle of their respective ethnic groups for self-determination.  
The House of Representatives and the Communal Chambers proved to be the 
playground for nationalistic fronts on both sides to advance their rhetoric through the 
media coverage that the two bodies offered.9 As far as the two Communal Chambers 
are concerned they were the showcases for the ethnic isolation of both communities. 
Among their respective competences were all educational, cultural and teaching 
matters. Inevitably, this entailed the continuation of nationalistic discourse by other 
means, especially through public education. In the years that followed, the Church 
and students of public schools proved to be the prime exponents of Greek irredentism. 
Conversely, the rise of Turkish Cypriot nationalism as a counteraction to Greek 
irredentism exacerbated the tensed political climate.10 In the case of the Communal 
Chambers, the lamentably lost opportunity was the failure to create a common public 
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space where the new generation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots would be educated 
together. 
The Greek Cypriot political elite offered numerous occasions to its Turkish 
Cypriot counterpart to doubt its commitment to the new state of affairs. Public 
statements by President Makarios and Greek Cypriot ministers11 referred to the 
“struggle that continues” 12  and contained a persistent revisionist view of the 
Constitution. Conversely, the Turkish Cypriot elite considered the “London-Zurich 
Republic” as a “transitory phase” towards the “final solution”.13 
The hallmarks of the inability to reach compromises were the failure to agree 
on the issues of separate municipalities and taxation within the parliament. After the 
events of 1963-64 and the passing over of the exclusive control of the Republic to the 
Greek Cypriots, the House of Representatives passed a unanimous resolution 
declaring that the struggle would continue until the achievement of Enosis.14 The 
Greek Cypriots had not abandoned Enosis as their political vision, which explains to a 
large extent their unwillingness to cooperate with Turkish Cypriots for the effective 
operation of the new State.  
Bi-communality was also visible at the level of the electoral constituency. The 
two communities were required to elect the members of the parliament and the 
President and Vice-President through separate electoral processes. Inescapably, this 
had both practical and political ramifications: Greek and Turkish Cypriots were 
registered in separate electoral rolls and followed different campaigns. To our 
understanding, this issue lies at the intersection of the two distinct fields we examine 
in this article, namely State institutions and citizenship. We consider that the 
constitutional scheme for citizenship is a notion inescapably entwined with the 
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shaping of the political units of the two communities, which, in turn have the right to 
elect State institutions.    
The mutual suspicion and lack of trust is evidenced by numerous incidents 
that reinforced the mistrust of the respective leaderships and discouraged cooperation. 
The submission of 13 points for the revision of the Constitution by President 
Makarios was the showcase of the revisionist stance of the Greek Cypriot side. The 
proposal intended to neutralize the political position of the Turkish Cypriots by 
downsizing their ratio of representation to their actual population size, unifying the 
judiciary and abolishing the veto powers of the President and Vice-President, as well 
as the separate majorities that were needed in the House of Representatives.  
Makarios’ proposals would establish a majoritarian rule, which prima facie 
seemed concordant with democratic precepts. However, given the political 
circumstances on the island, they were politically non-pragmatic since they sought to 
fully reshape the power sharing scheme and public affairs that was reached through 
the 1960 agreements.15 Expectedly, the proposals were singlehandedly rejected by the 
Turkish Cypriots and formed part of an escalation of events that led to the first 
partition of the island. After the events of 1963 and 1974, and due to the deprivation 
of all electoral rights for Turkish Cypriots residing in the areas under the effective 
control of the Government of Cyprus, a Turkish Cypriot citizen challenged this before 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The latter found that:  
‘the applicant, as a member of the Turkish-Cypriot community living in the 
government-controlled area of Cyprus, was completely deprived of any 
opportunity to express his opinion in the choice of the members of the House 
of Representatives of the country of which he is a national and where he has 
always lived’.16  
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The ECtHR thus brought an end to the decades-long lack of legislation, which 
operated as a tool of exclusion directed against Turkish Cypriots. 
In 2006, the same Court declared inadmissible the application of two Turkish 
Cypriots, who, conversely to the previous case, resided in the Turkish-occupied areas. 
The applicants had requested “to be placed on a separate electoral list, namely, a 
Turkish electoral list, in order to vote and stand for the parliamentary elections”. 
Interestingly, the Court rejected their complaints and went on to state that:  
‘Even if it were [valid to compare themselves to the Turkish Cypriots residing 
in the Government Controlled Areas], for the reasons given above, there is 
objective and reasonable justification and a legitimate basis for distinguishing 
for electoral purposes between those Turkish Cypriots who chose to remain in 
the “TRNC” under the day-to-day administration of the de facto authorities 
and those Turkish Cypriots who lived within the area controlled by the 
Government, subject to the direct impact of the measures adopted by the 
legislature of the Republic.’17  
To our view, this excerpt confirms our understanding of the hiatus within the socio-
political fabric of Cypriot society. The two communities continue to be perceived as 
two distinct political units destined to be antagonistic to each other. More 
fundamentally, it confirms a crude reality: since 1963 with the first partition, and 
1974 with the forcible segregation of the population and the geographical division, the 
two communities cannot engage in meaningful and multi-layered political 
communication. The exceptions to this are the informal mini-sized rapprochement 
groups and part of the political leadership of the two communities.18  
To sum up, the Greek Cypriot political elite had never accepted the 1960 
arrangement and maintained a persistently revisionist view towards achieving Enosis. 
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On the other side of the political spectrum, the Turkish Cypriots insisted on the letter 
of the Constitution, missing many times the expediencies of reality.  
 
4. Citizenship 
The 1960 arrangement encapsulated the transitional arrangements on the acquisition 
of citizenship.19 The Constitution provided that “any matter relating to citizenship 
shall be governed by the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty of Establishment.”20 In 
turn, Annex D granted citizenship to persons that had been accorded the subject of 
British subjects by way of colonial legislation or were born in the island after 1914, 
provided that they had ordinarily resided in Cyprus at any time in the period of five 
years immediately before the date of the Treaty of Establishment.21 
Article 2 of the Constitution provided the criteria of language, cultural 
traditions and religion as indicators of participation in either community. At the same 
time, this arrangement did not envision the option of non-participation in either 
community. Citizens were free to opt to belong to the community of their choice and 
exit from it, but should they decide to exit one, they would automatically be delegated 
to the other community. Another blind spot of this arrangement was the fact that 
minority groups that did not meet the criteria set out in the Constitution were obliged 
to collectively choose their membership to either community. Eventually, this resulted 
in three religious groups choosing to be considered part of the Greek Cypriot 
community.  
For the most part of the population, meeting all three criteria was the rule. The 
Greek fraction of the population spoke Greek, was Greek Orthodox and shared Greek 
cultural traditions. The same can be said for the Turkish segment of the population 
that was predominantly Moslem, spoke Turkish and partook to the Turkish cultural 
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traditions. Contrary to the classical liberal tradition, which endows individuals with 
the capacity of citizen based solely on the relationship between the State and the 
individual and is colourblind to any other attributes, the Cypriot paradigm is premised 
on an ethnically mediated citizenship. In other words, to be a citizen of the Republic 
an individual must first demonstrate possession of at least one characteristic that 
places him/her within one ethnic community. It is only through this communal 
participation that an individual can be regarded as a citizen.  
In essence, individuals are required to take upon themselves a specifically 
delineated and pre-ordained identity, which places them in a separate and competing 
group of persons. As a consequence, the nationalistic discourse that had been 
prevalent in both communities before independence was officially endorsed and 
confirmed within the new legal order. The communal division was not only legally 
entrenched in the new Constitution, nor was it solely of a symbolic nature. The 
ascendance of Archbishop Makarios III and Dr. Fazil Küçük to the offices of 
President and Vice-President of the Republic respectively, sealed the nationalistic 
antagonism between the two communities and shaped the political discourse between 
the two for many years.22 Both were representative figures of their communities’ 
conflicting aspirations and none of the two political figures had ever sincerely 
endorsed the new state of affairs. From the highest official posts to the plain citizens 
of the Republic, the message was that the communal identity and loyalty were the two 
single most important values to be guarded. 
The antagonism between the political elites of the two communities was 
underpinned by a deep-rooted and relentless suspicion against each other. On the one 
side, the Greek Cypriots considered that the London-Zurich agreements were flawed 
for two main reasons: first, they were considered as an impediment to the realization 
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of the claim for self-determination and Enosis and second, they were thought to 
unjustly afford the Turkish Cypriot community a quota representation in State 
institutions that exceeded its actual population size. On the other side, the Turkish 
Cypriots would not accept any arrangement that would relegate their community to 
merely a minority group, preordained to follow the political destiny of Greek 
Cypriots.  
Another problematic feature of the mediated capacity for citizenship was the 
position of minority groups. Soon after independence, three religious groups were 
officially recognized. Armenians, Maronites and Latins (Roman Catholics) chose to 
join the Greek Cypriot community. Accordingly, together with their particular ethnic, 
religious and linguistic characteristics, they were essentially forced to fit into the 
straightjacket of a new identity, with which they had little, if no, affinity. This 
constitutional arrangement may have been dictated by the political realities of the 
1960s, but nowadays can only be seen as problematic. In this connection the Advisory 
Committee of the Framework Convention for the protection of National Minorities 
has criticized this state of affairs in all three Opinions it has issued on RoC. In 
addition, it has been pointed out that:  
“in the Cypriot system, political integration operates through the mediation of 
cultural communities; it is through the affiliation with a cultural community 
that individual citizens participate in the political institutions. This conflicts 
with a critical dimension of contemporary international minority rights, 
namely the idea that people should be free to identify or not with a cultural 
group”.23  
The latter observation clearly illustrates the intrinsic relationship between citizenship, 
participation in public affairs and State institutions. In fact, this criticism is equally 
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applicable to the full spectrum of different groups on the island and not only to the 
three religious groups. However, we do acknowledge that in the broader scheme of 
the Cyprus issue the treatment of minorities and their effective political representation 
was neither a key issue nor a decisive point for the success or failure of the State-
building project.  
The division of citizens along the lines of ethnic affiliation was not devised by 
the 1960 arrangement. It is the historical legacy of the immediately preceding state of 
affairs that had paved the way for this arrangement. In the bodies that were set up by 
the British colonial administration the two communities were allowed to be 
represented not as a whole, but as group collectivities that were defending solely their 
communities’ interests.24 Instances of cross-communal cooperation were scarce, thus 
shaping the competing position of the two communities. At the same time, the 
emergence of Greek and Turkish nationalisms on the island precluded any serious 
attempts for cross-communal cooperation and shaping of political affairs outside the 
framework of the dominant discourses advocating for Enosis or Taksim. This 
configured into the core ideological outlook of the two communities with the advent 
of independence. In other words, the division within the society was already well 
embedded by 1960 and was naturally extended well into the new state of affairs. Only 
this time, it bore a constitutional birthmark.  
The communal system of political representation did not allow for bi-
communal parties to engage into the political sphere, excluding in this way any real 
convergences. Even the example of PEO, the left-wing workers’ union that had 
achieved in having a bi-communal membership, lost much of its Turkish Cypriot 
members under the pressure of nationalistic rhetoric.25 Hence, the new constitutional 
setting did not include anything that would allow the forging of a new Cypriot 
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consciousness based on a civic patriotism. To the contrary: Cypriot citizens were 
confined to the boundaries of their ethnic community that inescapably shaped not 
only inter-communal relations at all levels, but also all future plans for a solution.  
This is what we consider one of the most serious failures of the Constitution of 
Cyprus: the fact that it failed to create a unitary Cypriot demos and shared public 
spheres where synergies among citizens would be fostered.26  
Despite the fact that parts of the Constitution have either remained inactive or 
substantially amended through subsequent constitutional practice and the doctrine of 
necessity, bi-communality survives until today. The Constitution, read in the light of 
present day conditions prevailing in and outside the island, does not realistically offer 
a framework for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. However, its 
founding stone survives, and is even more enhanced, in the proposals for reaching a 
solution. Bi-communality has burgeoned its “bi-” nature in new areas, creating the 
“credo” of negotiations. For decades the two communities are ostensibly committed 
to reaching a solution, which would configure as a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation 
with political equality, as defined by UN resolutions. The surviving and revamped 
1960 bi-communality is examined in the second part of the article. 
 
C. The Annan Plan  
1.  From a “functional federation” to a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation 
As we already mentioned, both communities were looking at the 1960 arrangement as 
merely a step towards the accomplishment of their aspirations. Thus, inevitably, 
RoC’s consociational constitutional structure was questioned from the very first years 
of its life. In the aftermath of the 1963-4 inter-communal conflict, the two 
communities together with the three Guarantor States and the UN started negotiating 
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again in order to find a viable solution for Cyprus. Such efforts were intensified after 
the 1974 Turkish invasion.  
In the aftermath of the Turkish intervention and the consequent territorial 
segregation of the two communities, however, a settlement like the one designed by 
the 1960 Cyprus Agreements, was deemed inadequate. From then on, any proposal 
for a settlement had to include some form of Turkish Cypriot territorial entity. The 
Acheson Plan, the proposals by UN mediator Galo Plaza, the Gobbi Initiative, the 
First and Second Sets of Ideas are some of the past proposals for a settlement of the 
Cyprus problem that exhibit this transition to more entrenched forms of bi-
communalism entailing bi-zonality as well.  
In fact, all the plans drafted by the UN were largely based on the principles of 
bi-zonality, bi-communality and political equality of the two communities. Those 
three principles, being the basic parameters of the settlement of the Cyprus issue, 
were first introduced by the High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 between the 
then leaders of the two communities. They have been part of the narrative of the 
Cyprus conflict since then. Nevertheless, one has to mention the differences between 
how the two communities interpret those concepts and envisage the application of 
those principles.  
For instance, the former President Christofias has stressed that the Greek 
Cypriot community had exhausted its limits with the major concession made by 
President Makarios in 1977, according to which the solution will be based on a bi-
zonal, bi-communal federation, and thus it cannot go any further. “Neither a 
confederation, nor a new partnership of two states through ‘virgin birth’ can be 
accepted. The federal solution will be a partnership of two communities”.27  
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In response, the former leader of the Turkish Cypriot community attached 
great importance to  
“the continuation of the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance as an 
essential part of a settlement; safeguards to ensure that neither side can claim 
jurisdiction over the other; and maintaining the internal balance between the 
two sides in Cyprus as well as the external balance between Greece and 
Turkey over Cyprus”.28  
He also reaffirmed that the community he represented has “no intention of 
giving up their rights over the island of Cyprus. We know that these rights of ours can 
be safeguarded by “the political equality of the two peoples and the equal status of the 
two constituent states”.29 
The differences in the way the two ethno-religious communities approach the 
basic parameters of the comprehensive settlement and which particular aspects they 
have decided to focus upon are obvious. Be that as it may, one has to highlight that 
both communities agree that the solution entails a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation 
with political equality, as defined by relevant Security Council resolutions, with a 
single sovereignty, citizenship and international personality.30 It is exactly those 
principles that the UN has adequately defined both in Security Council Resolutions 
and Reports of the Secretary-General.  
First of all, the term “political equality” of the two communities has been 
defined in Resolution 716 (1991), which refers to the UN Secretary-General’s Report 
of 8 July 1990. In paragraph 11 of this Report, the then UN Secretary-General Perez 
de Cuellar sustains that although “political equality does not mean equal numerical 
participation in all federal government branches it should be reflected in various 
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ways”. Most importantly, it entails “the effective participation of both communities in 
all organs and decisions of the federal government”.  
On the other hand, the definition of the term “bi-zonal and bi-communal 
federation” appears in paragraphs 17 to 25 of the Report of Boutros Boutros-Ghali of 
3 April 1992. Security Council Resolution 750 (1992) has endorsed these paragraphs, 
and they provide as follows: 
“The federal state of Cyprus will have a single international personality and 
sovereignty as well as a single citizenship. The two communities reject as 
options union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of 
partition or secession. The federation will be bi-communal as regards the 
Constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects. The bi-
zonality of the federation is reflected in the fact that each federated state would 
be administered by one community, which would be guaranteed a clear 
majority of the population and of land ownership in its area. The freedom of 
settlement and the right to property would be implemented in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution that would be based on the principle of bi-
zonality.” 
The Security Council has never reversed these principles. Instead, they have been 
verified, developed and incorporated in the UN settlement proposals. 31  More 
importantly, they have also been reaffirmed in the course both of the previous and the 
current round of bi-communal negotiations.32  
 
2.  The structure of the United Cyprus Republic (UCR) 
So, unsurprisingly, the Annan Plan, which was presented to the two communities on 
31 March 2004 in Burgenstock (Switzerland), also follows the principles of bi-
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zonality, bi-communality and political equality. The United Cyprus Republic, as 
envisaged in the Annan Plan, would have been a federal State modelled on the 
principle of consociational democracy,33 as it has successfully been adopted in the 
Constitutions of Switzerland and Belgium.  
In the case of UCR, segmental autonomy would have been institutionalized in 
the form of federalism in accordance with the principle of bi-zonality. Reunified 
Cyprus would have been an independent and sovereign State, which would have 
consisted of two constituent States, namely the Greek Cypriot constituent State and 
the Turkish Cypriot constituent State. The status and relationship of UCR, its federal 
Government, and its constituent States, was modelled on the status and relationship of 
Switzerland, its federal Government, and its cantons.34  
Bi-communality would have served as the basic standard of political 
representation, public service appointments, and allocation of public funds. The 
overrepresentation of the Turkish Cypriot segment was adopted as a safeguard of the 
viability of the new State since the two communities had acknowledged each other’s 
distinct identity and integrity and that their relationship is not one of majority and 
minority, but of political equality.35  
The political equality and the autonomy of the two ethno-religious segments 
inside UCR’s political system were also reflected citizenship arrangements of the new 
State.36 Although there was a single Cypriot citizenship, every person holding it 
would also have enjoyed internal constituent State citizenship status.37 Despite the 
fact that such a status would have been complementary to, and would not have 
replaced, the Cypriot citizenship, it would have consisted of the deciding criterion for 
any provision that would refer to the constituent State origins of a person. Thus, it 
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would have been a clear depiction of the autonomy of the two ethnic groups of the 
United Cyprus Republic.  
More analytically, the federal Government would have sovereignly exercised 
the powers specified in the Constitution.38 The Office of the Head of State would have 
been vested in the Presidential Council, which would have exercised the executive 
power.39 The Council would have had six voting members, which would have been 
elected by Parliament for a fixed five-year term on a single list by special majority. 
Parliament could also elect additional non-voting members. The composition of the 
Council would have been proportional to the population of each constituent State, 
although at least one third of the members should have hailed from each constituent 
State.40 Given the numbers of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot population, 
this rule would practically mean that UCR’s Presidential Council would have 
comprised four Greek Cypriot and two Turkish Cypriot voting members.  
In addition to the rule on the composition of the Council, in which the 
characteristic of power-sharing was clearly reflected, the Constitution was providing 
for a rule according to which the Council would have strived to reach all decisions by 
consensus.41 Where it would have failed to reach consensus, it would have made 
decisions by simple majority of members present and voting. Such majority, however, 
should have, in all cases, comprised at least one member from each constituent State. 
Practically, this would have meant that the two Turkish Cypriot voting members of 
the Presidential Council could have been able to block a decision in order to protect 
the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community, in accordance with the principle of 
political equality. In essence, this would be the transformation of the original veto 
right of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President under the London-Zurich arrangement. 
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The constituent States were of equal status in order for the principle of 
political equality of the two ethno-religious communities to be strengthened.42 Within 
the limits of the Constitution and within their territorial boundaries, they would have 
sovereignly exercised all powers not vested in the federal Government. To this effect, 
the Constitutions of the two Constituent States were declaring the loyalty of those 
entities to UCR’s Constitution.43 
The federal parliament would have been composed of the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate.44 Each Chamber would have had 48 members. The Chamber 
of Deputies would have been composed of deputies from both constituent States. The 
seats would have been attributed on the basis of the number of persons holding 
internal constituent State citizenship status. Each constituent State would have had at 
least one quarter of the seats. The minorities, being the Maronites, the Latins and the 
Armenians, would have been represented by one deputy at least.  
The Senate would have been a paritarian body composed of an equal number 
of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot senators. The Cypriot citizens, voting 
separately as Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, irrespective of their constituent 
State citizenship, would have elected the Senators. Clearly, such a provision would 
have resulted in the preservation of the ethnic cleavages in the new State. The reason 
being that the citizens would have voted on the basis of their ethnic affiliation and not 
of their constituent state citizenship. In that sense, it is par excellence an example of 
an arrangement that aimed at freezing a particular inter-group configuration in time 
by following a rather corporate consociational logic. It is a choice that would have set 
bi-communality in stone. 
Decisions of Parliament would have needed the approval of both Chambers 
with a simple majority of members present and voting, including one quarter of the 
		 21 
senators present and voting from each constituent State and two-fifths in the case of 
matters where the decision would have required a special majority.45 Hence, it would 
have also been possible for the Turkish Cypriot senators to veto an unfavourable 
decision.   
Concerning the judiciary, there would have been a Supreme Court, comprised 
of an equal number of judges from each constituent State and three non-Cypriot 
judges.46  Its role would have been to uphold the Constitution and ensure its full 
effect. It would have had exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between the constituent 
States, between one or both constituent States and the federal Government and 
between organs of the federal Government. It would have also had exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine the validity of any federal or constituent State law under 
UCR’s Constitution and primary jurisdiction over violations of federal law.47 More 
importantly, the Court would have been the arbiter where deadlocks would have 
occurred.48 In such event, the Supreme Court of Cyprus would have taken an interim 
decision on the matter, to remain in force until such time as the institution in question 
would have taken a final decision. Thus, according to the constitutional design of the 
Annan Plan, the body that would have been mandated to exercise judicial review in 
the new legal order would also have been the body that would decide on the most 
divisive issues.  
Finally, the Annan Plan provided for the procedure for constitutional 
amendments.49 Apart from Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution, which are regarded as 
basic and thus cannot be amended,50 any constitutional amendment would have been 
considered and adopted by the federal Parliament after consultation with the 
constituent State Governments and interested sectors of society. Following their 
adoption by both Chambers of Parliament, the proposed amendments would have 
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been submitted to referendum for approval by a separate majority of the people in 
each constituent State.  
 
3. Citizenship and citizenship rights in the UCR 
UCR would have been a bi-communal federation, but there would have been a single 
Cypriot citizenship.51 Moreover, all persons holding Cypriot citizenship would have 
also enjoyed internal constituent state citizenship status as provided for by 
constitutional law. Such status, attributed on the basis of the residence at the date the 
settlement would have come into force, would have been complementary to, and 
would not have replaced, Cypriot citizenship.52 It is important to note that no one 
would have held the internal constituent citizenship status of both constituent States. 
Provisions, which stated that the constitutional Law on Internal Constituent State 
Citizenship Status and Constituent State Residency Rights regulated the internal 
constituent state citizenship status, were included in the Constitutions of both the 
constituent Cypriot States. The constituent State citizenship status, similar to the 
regime in the Åland islands53 and to the EU citizenship, was designed in such a way 
that it would have been connected with the exercise of political rights by the UCR 
citizens with the exception of the election of the Senate. 
However, the internal constituent State citizenship status and the principle of 
bi-zonality would also have meant restrictions to the exercise of certain rights in the 
new State. Firstly, there would have been limitation on the right of natural persons, 
not permanently residing in the Turkish Cypriot constituent State for at least three 
years, and of legal persons to purchase immovable property in that State, without 
permission of the competent authority of that constituent State. Those restrictions on 
the acquisition of property in the Turkish Cypriot constituent State should have lasted 
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for 15 years or, alternatively, until the gross domestic product per capita in that 
constituent State remained below 85 per cent of the gross domestic product per capita 
in the Greek Cypriot State. The proposed authorization procedure was deemed 
necessary not only because of the economic disparities between the Turkish Cypriot 
constituent State and EU Member States, but also between the two communities. The 
purpose of that arrangement was to avoid unacceptable sudden price increases and a 
large-scale buy-out of land.54 In other words, it would have served as a safeguard 
clause, according to which the authorities of the Turkish Cypriot constituent State 
could deny the right of non-resident natural persons and legal persons to acquire 
property for a specific period of time.55  
Moreover, apart from restrictions on the right to acquire property in northern 
Cyprus, restrictions on residence rights were also provided. The recognition of the 
particular national identity of Cyprus and the need for protection of the balance 
between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, the bi-zonal character of the 
UCR and the distinct identity and integrity of the constituent States necessitated 
certain safeguards and temporary restrictions on the residence rights of Cypriot 
citizens, as well as citizens of Greece and Turkey.56 Article 2 of the Draft Act of 
Adaptation (DAA) provided for the terms that would have applied to the right to 
residence of the Cypriot citizens in the constituent States of the UCR. According to it, 
restrictions on the right of Cypriot citizens to reside in a constituent State of which 
they would not have held the internal constituent State citizenship status, should not 
have been precluded in the form of a moratorium during the first five years of the life 
of the reunified State, notwithstanding existing provisions of EU law. Later on, 
between the sixth and ninth years, the percentage of people not holding the relevant 
constituent State citizenship status could not exceed six per cent of the total 
		 24 
population of the respective municipality or village. This percentage would have been 
doubled between the tenth and fourteenth years. For the following five years, or until 
Turkey’s accession, the relevant percentage could have reached 18 per cent. Finally, 
after the nineteenth year, following the establishment of a new state of affairs, either 
constituent State could, with a view to protecting its identity, take safeguard measures 
to ensure that no less than two-thirds of its permanent residents speak its official 
language as their mother tongue.  
Clearly, all those restrictions are in stark contrast with the 
international conventions that have been put in place in support of the rights of 
individuals from a liberal perspective such as the European Convention of Human 
Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Although the restrictions on the 
right to residency and property of the Cypriot citizens within their own State could be 
potentially justified because they would serve the public policy goal of the 
reunification, they have been underlined as important reasons for the rejection of the 
Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriot community.57 But could they have realistically been 
avoided? 
 
D.  Understanding an inherent contradiction 
A famous quote by Massimo d’ Azeglio says: “L’Italia è fatta. Restano da fare gli 
italiani” [Italy has been created. It remains for Italians to be created.] and it seems to 
us that in certain perspectives the same holds true for the case of Cyprus.  What we 
have attempted to explore so far in this article is how bi-communality is deeply rooted 
in the constitutional structure of the Republic and in the Annan Plan as the most 
comprehensive and detailed attempt to resolve the Cyprus problem. Although space 
constraints did not allow for an in-depth comparative study of all proposals for its 
		 25 
resolution, we can nonetheless confirm that bi-communality is a permanent building 
block.  
One might argue that this happens at the expense of a nation-building 
procedure that could allow for the bridging of the cleavages between the two ethno-
religious segments. However, both the political environment on the island and certain 
normative concerns on the state-building of divided societies might suggest that bi-
communality is a necessary condition for the establishment of a reunified State. In 
other words, Cyprus demonstrates a certain contradiction. On the one hand, external 
actors and local moderates wish to see the island and its people reunited on the other 
the specific institutional solutions suggested are divisive as shown in a number of 
provisions of the Annan Plan.58  
However, Cyprus is by no means unique. Such contradiction exists in conflict 
resolution practice in a number of divided societies where segmental autonomy and 
strict ethnic representation are used in order to keep all ethno-religious groups 
appeased. To a certain degree, this is unavoidable not least because the institutional 
designing of a post-conflict society is often characterized by ‘a joining together of 
constituent units which do not lose their identity when merging in some form of 
union’.59 In any case, the consociational model of democracy60 which most of those 
institutional structures (including the ones in Cyprus) adopt entails that every 
significant segment of the society proportionately participates in the government of 
the country while it retains a high degree of autonomy and the possibility to veto 
decisions of the majority in order to protect its vital interests. So, it is almost 
inevitable that constitutional systems that secure such a high degree of segmental 
autonomy will not be centered on the idea of “one nation, one state”. 
Post-Dayton Bosnia is probably the most striking example of such an 
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institutional designing in Europe. This (con)federal State is comprised of two 
ethnically defined entities: a Serb one and a Bosniak-Croat one,61 which enjoy wide-
ranging powers of self-government.62 More importantly, strict ethnic representation of 
the three constituent peoples is required for the Presidency, 63 the upper chamber of 
the legislature, 64  the Constitutional Court 65  and the Central Bank. 66  What is 
interesting to note in this case is that although the role of the international community 
in the constitutional steering of Bosnia cannot be overestimated, it is an international 
actor that has cast doubt with regard to the logic of the strict ethnic representation 
embodied in the system. The European Court of Human Rights in the famous Sejdić 
and Finci67 held that the ‘inexistence of the right for the non-constituent peoples to 
stand for election to the collective State Presidency and to the House of Peoples’68 
breaches the European Convention. 
Notwithstanding the decision of the Strasbourg Court, it is interesting to note 
how embedded are in the constitutions of Bosnia and in the Annan Plan both the 
segmental autonomy of the main ethno-religious groups and the link between ethnic 
identity and the exercise of political rights. Similar provisions securing the legislative 
autonomy of the main segments of a society can be found in a number of post-conflict 
arrangements. For instance, the Ahtisaari Plan was envisaging ‘an enhanced and 
sustainable system of local self government in Kosovo’ giving to the Serbian 
municipalities full and exclusive powers on a number of areas.69 Such solution was 
also adopted in the EU-brokered 15-points Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo in 
2013.70 Similarly in Macedonia, according to section 3(1) of the Ohrid Agreement the 
signatory parties undertook the responsibility to adopt a revised law on local self-
government entailing enhanced competences in a number of areas. But it is not only 
post-conflict arrangements that opt for segmental autonomy. Some constitutional 
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systems of consolidated democracies that aim at accommodating ethno-linguistic 
conflicts use it as well. One does not have to look further than the constitutions of 
Spain and Belgium in order to find ethnic and linguistic communities that enjoy a 
high level of legislative autonomy.71 
Apart from Bosnia and Cyprus, provisions of strict ethnic representation can 
be also found in Kosovo. Article 64(2) of the Constitution provides that minimum ten 
seats are reserved to the Kosovo Serb Community and another ten for the other 
minorities. But perhaps the most interesting example is the Good Friday Agreement, 
which created a power-sharing arrangement between the two main ethno-religious 
segments. Following the 2006 Saint Andrews Agreement, the First Minister is 
nominated by the largest political party in the Northern Ireland Assembly while the 
Deputy First Minister by the largest political party of the other political designation.72 
So, if the First Minister comes from the ‘Unionist’ political designation, the Deputy 
First Minister will come from the ‘Nationalist’ one and vice versa. More interestingly, 
the ministers are not chosen by this diarchy. Instead, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 
provides that the ministerial posts are allocated to all of those parties with significant 
representation in the Assembly. The number of posts to which each party is entitled, 
is determined according to the d’Hondt method of proportional representation. The 
actual posts are chosen by the parties in the order that the seats were awarded. This 
does not mean that apart from the two largest parties, the other parties are required to 
enter the Executive. They can choose to go into opposition if they wish.73  
So, the institutional arrangements suggested for Cyprus according to which 
segmental autonomy and strict ethnic representations are used in expense of a nation-
building process are far from an exception. In fact, the same contradiction can be 
found in a number of European constitutions that aim at accommodating an ethno-
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linguistic conflict. Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Northern Ireland, among else, 
provide for such examples. 
 
E. In lieu of a conclusion  
What we have argued so far is that bi-communality has a Janus-like face: one side of 
it features as an indispensable element to any future solution, but the other seems to 
perpetuate the seed of division along the lines of communal affiliation.74 This is 
something that one can observe in almost every arrangement that has consociational 
characteristics. Yet, the perennial question remains what a commentator phrased as 
the innovation of “a method whereby, over time, Cypriot nationality would trump 
communal affiliation”.75  
Concerning the political environment one has to note that according to the 
“Cyprus 2015” opinion polls,76  Greek Cypriots would ideally prefer a unitary state 
but would be prepared to live with a bi-zonal bi-communal federation. At the same 
time, Turkish Cypriots would ideally prefer a two-states solution, but would accept a 
bi-zonal bi-communal federation. This might suggest that bi-communality offers the 
necessary middle ground for the achievement of the long-awaited comprehensive 
settlement.   
In any case, it seems that in order for a plan for the comprehensive settlement 
of the Cyprus issue to be successful, it should be characterized by what Christine Bell, 
citing Ramsbotham, calls “Clausewitz in reverse”.77 Claus von Clausewitz described 
war as “simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other 
means”.78 According to the “Clausewitz in reverse” view, then, a future peace 
agreement on the Cyprus issue should be viewed in converse terms, as a legal 
document which embraces politics as the continuation of the conflict of the two 
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communities by other means. The preservation and incorporation of all the clashing 
claims at the heart of the conflict would paradoxically aim to transform it away from 
the current stalemate, by designing political and legal institutions in which the conflict 
can continue to be negotiated. In other words, the future settlement plan should be 
recognized as a forum of meta-constitutional debate, a debate as to what type of 
constitutional vision will prevail at the domestic level.79 Such an approach would also 
favour bi-communality as a distinct element of the future Cypriot Constitution.  
In this connection, the proposal for a rotating presidency with cross-voting 
actually moves towards the direction we endorse.80 In effect, both elements of this 
proposal reconcile facially conflicting parameters: on the one hand, the rotation of the 
office of the President embodies bi-communality and political equality of the two 
communities, while, on the other hand, establishing a common political forum for the 
two electoral constituencies by providing the opportunity to influence the outcome of 
the elections in the other community. The added value of this proposal is that it breaks 
away from the traditional negotiating paradigm and espouses a different model of 
statecraft. 
And a final point: beyond devising meticulous details of a bi-communal 
constitutional design, lies the fundamental question of its actual functionality. 
Notwithstanding the final outcome of the negotiation process, a functional solution 
will not so much rely on these details, but rather on the goodwill and genuine 
commitment of the two communities and their political elites; precisely the elements 
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